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Torts. Boston Inv. Property #1 State v. E.W. Burman, Inc., 658
A.2d 515 (R.I. 1995). In the absence of privity of contract, a subse-
quent purchaser of commercial property is not entitled to recover
economic damages as a result of the alleged negligence of a third-
party general contractor.
Where there is privity of contract, a purchaser of real estate
may maintain a cause of action against a negligent general con-
tractor for breach of contract as well as breach of express and im-
plied warranties of reasonable workmanship and habitability.1
However, in Boston Inv. Property #1 State v. E.W. Burman, Inc.,2
the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a general contractor
can not be held liable for his alleged negligent construction of a
commercial property which caused economic damages to a subse-
quent purchaser, in the absence of foreseeable harm to such
purchaser.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In November of 1985, plaintiff Boston Investment Property #1
State (Boston Investment) purchased a newly constructed six-story
commercial office building from Capital Hill Development (Capi-
tal), not subject to any express warranties concerning the condition
of the property.3 Shortly after the transaction, Boston Investment
alleged that the windows leaked when it rained and that erosion
problems were present in the parking lot.4 Boston Investment
filed suit against Capital in the United States District Court for
the District of Rhode Island alleging breach of contract, as well as
breach of express and implied warranties. 5
Subsequently, Capital Hill filed a third-party complaint
against the general contractor for the building, E.W. Burman, Inc.
(Burman), alleging negligence in construction.6 Boston Invest-
ment then moved to amend its complaint in order to add a claim of
1. See generally Boghossian v. Ferland Corp., 600 A.2d 288 (R.I. 1991); Lee v.
Morin, 469 A.2d 358 (R.I. 1983); Padula v. J.J. Deb-Cin Homes, Inc., 111 R.I. 29,
298 A.2d 529 (R.I. 1973).
2. 658 A.2d 515 (R.I. 1995).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 516.
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negligence directly against Burman. 7 After the district court
granted Boston Investment's motion to amend, Burman objected
and moved to certify the question presented in this matter to the
Rhode Island Supreme Court.8 The certified question was whether
a subsequent purchaser of commercial property in Rhode Island is
entitled to recover economic damages alleged to have been proxi-
mately caused by the negligence of the general contractor, in the
absence of privity of contract with that general contractor. 9
BACKGROUND
Previously, in Forte Bros., Inc. v. Nat'l Amusements, Inc., the
Rhode Island Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a
third-party plaintiff, who may foreseeably be injured or may suffer
an economic loss proximately caused by the negligent performance
of a contractual duty, has a cause of action in negligence in the
absence of privity. 10 The court held that a general contractor could
maintain a negligence claim for purely economic loss against an
architect, even in the absence of privity of contract.1 The court in
Forte determined that the absence of privity can be overcome when
there has been "direct and reasonable reliance by the contractor on
the contractual performance" of an architect who knows, or should
know, of that reliance.1 2
ANALYsIs AND HOLDING
Notwithstanding Forte., the Rhode Island Supreme Court an-
swered the certified question in the present case in the negative.
The court held that in the absence of privity of contract with the
general contractor, a subsequent purchaser of commercial property
in Rhode Island is not entitled to recover economic damages alleg-
edly caused by the negligence of the general contractor. 13 This is
true even though the purchaser was the first purchaser of the prop-
erty from the developer, and took title less than one year after
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 515.
10. 525 A.2d 1301 (R.I. 1987).
11. Id. at 1303.
12. Id. (citations omitted).
13. Boston Investment, 658 A.2d at 518.
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completion of the building.14 The court reasoned that Boston In-
vestment, as a future buyer, was neither known to nor identifiable
to defendant contractor. Their individual relationships with the
original owner were wholly independent of each other. There was
no foreseeable harm to a subsequent owner based on alleged negli-
gence on the part of the builder, particularly because the original
owner might well have corrected any problems or absorbed any
losses long before any sale.15
The court distinguished Forte from the instant case, in that in
Forte "the plaintiff contractor and the defendant architect were col-
laborators on the same project, with each dependent on the other
to complete the project."' 6 This was deemed distinguishable from
the situation in Boston Investment where each party had an in-
dependent contract and was not a collaborator with the owners of
the property.' 7
CONCLUSION
A subsequent purchaser of commercial property in Rhode Is-
land cannot maintain a claim of negligence seeking economic dam-
ages against the general contractor for the property, in the absence
of privity of contract. However, given that the parties to the trans-
action were sophisticated commercial entities able to protect them-
selves from economic loss, the court's holding suggests that the
applicability of the decision may be limited to commercial entities
engaged in a real estate transaction.' 8
William T. Carline, III
14. Id. at 516.
15. Id. at 517.
16. Id. at 516.
17. Id. at 516-17.
18. Id. at 517-18 (citing Hydro-Mfg., Inc. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 640 A.2d 950
(R.I. 1994) (discussing the risk allocation framework for commercial real estate,
and stating that a sophisticated buyer has the option to inspect the property and to
inquire into possible defects prior to purchase)).
SURVEY SECTION
Torts. Ferreira v. Strack, 652 A.2d 965 (R.I. 1995). A social-host
is not under a duty of care to protect third parties from an intoxi-
cated driver leaving a party, where the driver had neither been
invited to attend the party nor was he offered or served alcohol.
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island confronted the question of
whether a social-host had a duty of care to pedestrians who were
injured when struck by a drunk driver. Because the driver had
neither been invited to the party nor acquainted with the host, the
court refused to create such a duty.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Upon crossing a street in a crosswalk, two victims were struck
by a vehicle driven by William Strack (Strack) who was indisputa-
bly intoxicated.1 Throughout the night of the incident Strack had
consumed significant amounts of alcohol at various locations before
attending a party being held at the defendants' home.2 Upon arri-
val at the defendants' home without any written or oral invitation,
Strack continued to consume alcohol which he had brought with
him to the party.3 At no time during the party, or on any previous
occasion, did the defendants have any contact with Strack.4 Strack
left the party briefly, only to return for a second time.5 On this
occasion, although not offered anything to drink, Strack helped
himself to a beer from the refrigerator.6 After leaving the defend-
ants' house for the second time, Strack traveled to another drink-
ing establishment where he continued to consume alcohol. 7
Following his departure from that establishment, Strack struck
two pedestrians.8
The pedestrian victims (Plaintiffs) brought an action in supe-
rior court alleging that the defendant social-hosts were negligent
in breaching a duty of care to the general public by not preventing
Strack, their guest, from driving.9 The defendants filed a motion
1. Ferreira v. Strack, 652 A.2d 965, 966 (R.I. 1995).
2. Id. at 966-67.
3. Id. at 966.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 967.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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for summary judgment, which was granted by the trial court. 10
Plaintiffs appealed the granting of this motion.11 The issue on ap-
peal was one of first impression in Rhode Island: "whether there
exists a duty of care owed by a defendant social-host to an innocent
third party who suffers injuries as a result of the negligent opera-
tion of a motor vehicle by an adult guest if the negligence is caused
by the guest's intoxication."1 2
BACKGROUND
Rhode Island law holds that "negligence is the breach of a
duty, the existence of which is a question of law.' 3 The issue of
"[wihether there exists a duty of care running from the defendant
to the plaintiff is, therefore, a question for the court and not for the
jury."14 Furthermore, in Banks v. Bowen's Landing Corp., the
court stated that where no duty exists the trier of fact is presented
with nothing to consider and a motion for summary judgment must
be granted. 15
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island has "never adopted the
principle that a social-host owes a duty to a third person injured by
an intoxicated person who has obtained intoxicating liquor" at the
social-host's home.16 Rather, the court has indicated on several oc-
casions that the creation of new causes of action, such as the one
claimed by the plaintiffs, must be left to the state legislature.' 7
In determining whether a social-host should be held liable to a
third party, the majority of jurisdictions have adhered to the com-
mon-law rule of social-host immunity.' 8 In order to justify the ad-
herence to this rule, these courts employ one of three different
rationales: traditional principles of common law, issues of social
policy, and deference to the legislature. 19 Of the majority jurisdic-
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. (quoting Barratt v. Burlingham, 492 A.2d 1219, 1222 (R.I. 1985)).
14. Id. (quoting Banks v. Bowen's Landing Corp., 522 A.2d 1222, 1224 (R.I.
1987)).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 968.
17. Id. See also Kalian v. People Acting through Community Effort, Inc., 408
A.2d 608, 609 (R.I. 1979); Castellucci v. Castellucci, 188 A.2d 467, 469 (R.I. 1963);
Levasseur v. Knights of Columbus, 188 A.2d 469, 471 (R.I. 1963).
18. Ferreira, 652 A.2d at 968. See cases cited infra note 20.
19. Id.
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tions, several indicate a reluctance to impose social-host liability
based on negligence principles alone.20 In only two jurisdictions,
New Jersey and Massachusetts, have the courts imposed liability
upon a social-host for negligent service of alcohol to a guest.2 1
CouRT's ANALYsIs AND HOLDING
The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's
granting of the defendants' summary judgment motion and held
that the trial justice correctly determined that no genuine issue of
material fact existed.22 The facts of the case at bar were not suffi-
ciently adequate to form a basis for the imposition of a duty of care
on the defendants. 23 The defendants neither met, invited, person-
ally knew, nor were aware of the intoxicated individual's presence
20. Id. (citing Faulk v. Suzuki Motor Co., Ltd., 851 P.2d 332 (Haw. Ct. App.
1993) (finding that a social-host had no tort-law duty to protect third persons from
intoxicated guests who attended the host's party and drove in a negligent manner,
causing injury); Ribbens v. Jawahir, 438 N.W.2d 252 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988) (ruling
that social-host liability does not extend to social host who served alcohol to an
adult who subsequently injured a third person as a result of his intoxication); Sites
v. Cloonan, 477 A.2d 547 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (finding that a noncommercial or-
ganization cannot be held liable for injuries arising from its service of alcohol at a
social event); Garren v. Cummings & McCrady, Inc., 345 S.E.2d 508 (S.C. Ct. App.
1986) (finding that no duty under common law or statute will be imposed upon a
social host; any action taken should be the result of legislative initiative, not judi-
cial interpretation); Graff v. Beard, 858 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1993) (declining to find
common-law social-host liability and refusing to judicially create a cause of action
that the legislature had specifically rejected), rev'g, Beard v. Graff, 801 S.W.2d 158
(Tex. Ct. App. 1990); Hansen v. Friend, 797 P.2d 521 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990) (em-
phasizing deference to the legislature); Overbaugh v. McCutcheon, 396 S.E.2d 153
(W. Va. 1990) (refusing in the absence of legislation, to impose social-host liability
against an employer who served liquor at a Christmas party; in making the deci-
sion, the court took notice of the fact that most jurisdictions do not impose such
common-law liability absent statutory law); Langle v. Kurkul, 510 A.2d 1301 (Vt.
1986) (holding that a social host owes no duty to an intoxicated adult guest)).
21. Ferreira, 652 A.2d at 968-69 (citing Kelly v. Gwinnell, 476 A.2d 1219, 1228
(N.J. 1984) (imposing liability on a social-host who serves alcoholic beverages to an
adult guest but limited the liability to situations where the host "directly serves
the guest and continues to do so even after the guest is visibly intoxicated.");
McGuiggan v. New England Telephone & Telegraph Co., 496 N.E.2d 141, 146
(Mass. 1986) (limiting the imposition of liability to situations where the host had
knowledge that the guest was drunk and permitted the guest to continue drink-
ing). In deciding whether a host exercised ordinary prudence a relevant considera-
tion is whether the host "knew or reasonably should have known that the
intoxicated guest might presently operate a motor vehicle." Id. See also Ulwick v.
DeChristopher, 582 N.E.2d 954 (Mass. 1991).
22. Ferreira, 652 A.2d at 969.
23. Id.
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at their house. In addition, Strack not only brought his own alco-
hol on his first visit, but during the course of his two visits he was
never served nor offered alcohol by anyone, including the defend-
ants.24 Moreover, the court considered it debatable as to whether
Strack could even be considered a guest.25 The court explained
that because the facts were undisputed that Strack had not re-
ceived an invitation, implied or express, the legal status of Strack
was deemed "more akin to that of a trespasser."26 In such in-
stances, the court explained that it would defer to the legislature to
set out any possible duties or responsibilities on social-hosts where
"[tihe imposition of liability upon social hosts for the torts of guests
has such serious implications. ... "27
CONCLUSION
A social-host is not under a duty of care to protect third parties
from a drunken driver where the driver had neither been invited to
attend the party, nor was offered or served alcohol. Presently, only
Massachusetts and New Jersey courts have held that such a duty
of care may exist under certain circumstances. 28 In this case of
first impression, however, the Rhode Island Supreme Court joined
the majority of states by holding that it is the province of the legis-
lature, and not the court, to create such a duty.
William T. Carline, III
24. Id. at 970.
25. Id. at 969.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 968.
28. See supra note 21.
SURVEY SECTION
Torts. Jolicoeur Furniture Co., Inc. v. Baldelli, 653 A.2d 740 (R.I.
1995). The mayor and planning director for a city are considered
third parties in relation to a contract between the city and a pur-
chaser of land, and may be held liable for tortious interference with
that contract.
Where a claim of tortious interference with a contract is
brought against an agent or employee of one of the parties to the
contract, the question arises whether the agent or employee can be
considered an entity separate and distinct from the contracting
party and subject to liability for interference, or whether he is part
of the contracting party. In Jolicoeur Furniture Co., Inc. v.
Baldelli,1 the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that both the
mayor and planning director for the City of Woonsocket were par-
ties separate from the city itself, therefore subject to liability for
tortiously interfering with a contract between the city and a pur-
chaser of land.2 However, because there was no violation of the
buyer's constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, awards
of punitive damages and attorneys' fees could not be sustained.3
FACTS AND TRAVEL
The owners of Jolicoeur Furniture (Jolicoeur) learned that the
State of Rhode Island intended to acquire the site of their present
store in order to accommodate construction of the Bernon Street
Bridge in Woonsocket, Rhode Island. 4 Jolicoeur thereafter con-
tacted the Woonsocket Department of Planning and Development
("Department of Planning" or "Department") for help in finding a
suitable site to relocate their business.5 The Department of Plan-
ning recommended three contiguous lots, of which the city owned
two, and recommended to the City Council that they sell the two
lots to Jolicoeur subject to the Department's approval of certain
aesthetic features of the building.6
1. 653 A.2d 740 (R.I. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 417 (1995).
2. Id. at 752-53.
3. Id. at 755.
4. Id. at 743.
5. Id.
6. Id.
19961
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Pursuant to Woonsocket City Council ordinance, the lots were
auctioned, with Jolicoeur tendering the highest bid.7 The bid was
accepted by the city treasurer subject to approval of the plans by
the Department of Planning.8 The city council thereafter passed
an ordinance authorizing the city treasurer to sell Jolicoeur the
land, subject to receipt of the purchase price as well as the ap-
proval of the Department. 9 The ordinance did not specify any re-
quirements for the Department's approval, nor did it set any
deadlines for approval. 10
Approximately one month later, the Rhode Island Department
of Environmental Management (DEM) informed the mayor of
Woonsocket that the subject land was subject to a State of Rhode
Island Heritage Bond Grant." The DEM further informed the De-
partment of Planning that if the sale of land to Jolicoeur occurred,
the grant would be withdrawn and Woonsocket would lose funding
for other projects as well. 12 In light of this development, the De-
partment recommended that the city withdraw from its transac-
tion with Jolicoeur, and the mayor similarly recommended that the
city return Jolicoeur's deposit. 13
On June 1, 1987, the city council passed an amendment to the
ordinance which required Jolicoeur to submit acceptable building
designs to the Department of Planning within 60 days.' 4 Although
having met on several occasions with members of the Department,
Jolicoeur's designs were not found to be acceptable by the dead-
line.15 Although the mayor took the position that Jolicoeur's right
to buy the land had expired, the city council again amended the
ordinance to extend the deadline for submission of acceptable
plans. 16 This ordinance was vetoed by the mayor, who explained
that he felt that the city was no longer under an obligation to deal
with Jolicoeur.' 7
7. Id. at 743-44.
8. Id. at 744.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 744-45.
13. Id. at 745.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 746.
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Jolicoeur filed suit against the City of Woonsocket, the plan-
ning director of the Department of Planning and the mayor.18
Jolicoeur alleged that the city had breached its contract, that the
director of planning and the mayor had tortiously interfered with
Jolicoeur's contract with the city and that all defendants had vio-
lated Jolicoeur's constitutional rights as well as 42 U.S.C. section
1983.19 The superior court held that the city had breached its con-
tract with Jolicoeur, and ordered specific performance. 20 A jury de-
termined that both the mayor and the director of planning had
tortiously interfered with the contract between Jolicoeur and the
city, and also that all defendants had "'violated plaintiff's rights
under the Federal Civil Rights Act; or [had violated].., plaintiffs'
constitutional rights.'"21 Based on the constitutional violations,
Jolicoeur was awarded punitive damages as well as attorneys'
fees.22
The defendants appealed to the Rhode Island Supreme Court
claiming, first, that the mayor and planning director of a city can-
not be held liable for tortious interference with a contract in which
the city is a party, because as city officials they are considered part
of the city.23 Further, the defendants asserted that there was no
violation of Jolicoeur's constitutional rights.24
BACKGROUND
A claim of tortious interference with a contractual relationship
consists of the following four elements: 1) the existence of a con-
tract; 2) the alleged wrongdoer's knowledge of the contract; 3) his
intentional interference with that contract; and 4) damages result-
ing therefrom.25 While the Rhode Island Supreme Court had not
previously considered whether city officials could be held liable for
interfering with city contracts, the court was faced with a roughly
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 746-47 (quoting special interrogatory from the jury).
22. Id. at 747.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Smith Dev. Corp. v. Bilow Enter., Inc., 112 R.I. 203, 211, 308 A.2d 477, 482
(1973); DiBiasio v. Brown & Sharpe Mfg. Co., 525 A.2d 489, 493 (R.I. 1987).
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analogous situation in the case of Roy v. Woonsocket Instit. for
Say.
2 6
In Roy, a dismissed employee brought a claim of tortious inter-
ference with a contractual relationship against his former supervi-
sor. The court held that the claim could not stand because of a lack
of "legal malice"on the part of the supervisor in firing the em-
ployee. 27 Legal malice does not spring from "spite or ill will," but is
"an intent to do harm without justification."28 Since the employee
in Roy had not shown that his termination was the result of his
supervisor's unjustified intention to cause harm, the claim for in-
tentional interference failed. 29
ANALysIs AND HOLDING
The court first determined that the four elements of inten-
tional interference with contractual relationship were present.
The contract between Jolicoeur and the city was valid and bind-
ing.30 Evidence at trial established that both the mayor and the
planning director were aware of the contract.31 Intentional inter-
ference of the contract was shown by the mayor's veto of the city
council's ordinance to extend Jolicoeur's deadline for submitting
plans, and by the planning director's refusal to consider such
plans.32 Finally, the court accepted the jury's determination that
Jolicoeur suffered damages in amount of $340,000, plus interest.33
The court next determined that the defendants had shown the
requisite "legal malice" in their interference with the contract. 34
"Although the defendants here may have had good motives be-
26. Jolicoeur, 653 A.2d at 753 (discussing Roy v. Woosocket Inst. for Say., 525
A.2d 915, 916-17 (R.I. 1987)).
27. Roy, 525 A.2d at 919.
28. Id. (quoting Mesolella v. City of Providence, 508 A.2d 661, 669-70 (R.I.
1986). See also Childress v. Abeles, 84 S.E.2d 176, 182 (N.C. 1954) ("Indeed, actual
malice and freedom from liability for this tort may coexist. If the outsider has a
sufficient lawful reason for inducing the breach of contract, he is exempt from lia-
bility for so doing, no matter how malicious in actuality his conduct may be.").
29. Roy, 525 A.2d at 919. See also Varner v. Bryan, 440 S.E.2d 295, 298-99
(N.C. App. 1994) (dismissed Town Manager's claim of intentional interference with
contractual relations against members of City Council fails because of failure to
prove that dismissal was result of legal malice).
30. Jolicoeur, 653 A.2d at 752.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 747.
34. Id.
SURVEY SECTION
cause of the potential loss of state funds to the city, they were not
legally justified in their attempt to obstruct the successful comple-
tion of the contract between the city and [Jolicoeur]."35 "Because
their actions were not justified and constituted legal malice toward
plaintiffs, their conditional privilege to act as agents of the city was
destroyed."3 6 Consequently, the court held that the trial justice
had properly denied the defendant's motion for a directed verdict
on the intentional interference claim.
37
Regarding Jolicoeur's claims of violations of the United States
Constitution and 42 U.S.C. section 1983, the court held that the
defendants' actions did not rise to a level of constitutional depriva-
tion.3 8 In the court's opinion, there was no need to go into a
lengthy analysis of Section 1983 because plaintiff had not been "de-
prived of a right 'secured by the Constitution and laws' of the
United States."39 "The plaintiffs have alleged that defendants had
taken their property without just compensation in violation of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitu-
tion."40 However, the court held that because "defendants are lia-
ble to plaintiffs under state common law, the procedural
requirements of the Due Process Clause are [ ] satisfied."41 More-
over, the plaintiff was not denied his substantive Due Process
rights. Substantive Due Process is violated by state actions which
are "'arbitrary and capricious' or that run counter to 'ordered lib-
erty' or that are 'shocking or violative of universal standards of de-
cency' or even 'too close to the rack and the screw'."42 In the
present case, defendants' behavior did not rise to such levels. 43
Since there were no Constitutional violations, there could be no vi-
olation of 42 U.S.C. section 1983. For that reason, the court held
that the award of punitive damages and attorneys fees could not
stand.44
35. Id.
36. Id. (citing Lorenz v. Dreske, 214 N.W.2d 753, 760 (Wis. 1974)).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 749-50.
39. Id. (citing Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 284, reh'g denied, 445 U.S.
920 (1980); Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140 (1979)).
40. Id. at 750.
41. Id. at n.1.
42. Id. at 751 (quoting Amsden v. Moran, 904 F.2d 748, 753-54 (1st Cir.
1990)).
43. Id.
44. Id.
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CONCLUSION
City officials may be held liable for intentional interference
with a contractual relationship between a third party and the city,
provided that the city official has acted with legal malice. How-
ever, in the instant case, such interference did not amount to a
denial of a third party's right to Due Process under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
Alan H. Wasserman
SURVEY SECTION
Torts. Mallette v. Children's Friend and Service, 661 A.2d 67 (R.I.
1995). 1 The common law tort of negligent misrepresentation is ex-
tended into the context of adoption.
Rhode Island does not have a statute that requires adoption
agencies to disclose relevant information to potential adopting par-
ents. However, this does not preclude the finding of a duty on the
part of the agency to give background information regarding the
child to be adopted in a non-negligent manner once the agency has
volunteered some information. In Mallette v. Children's Friend
and Service, the Rhode Island Supreme Court declined to create
the tort of wrongful adoption, and instead elected to extend the tort
of negligent misrepresentation to the adoption context. 2
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In 1981, the plaintiffs Thomas Mallette, Jr. and Deborah Mal-
lette (Mallettes) sought to adopt a child through the defendant
agency, Children's Friend and Service (CFS).3 CFS contacted the
Mallettes with information concerning the child, Christopher, age
one.4 Prior to the adoption, the Mallettes were told by CFS that
Christopher's biological mother had been diagnosed with learning
disabilities which were the result of a childhood head trauma.5
Christopher was adopted by the Mallettes later that year.6 In ac-
tuality, Christopher's biological mother had been diagnosed with
macrocephaly, 7 pseudoepicanthal folds,8 a high arched palate, 9
tachycardia,' 0 small clinodactyly of the fifth fingers," tremors of
1. The Rhode Island Supreme Court issued an opinion on a collateral issue to
this case in Mallette v. Children's Friend and Serv., 661 A.2d 74 (R.I. 1995). In
that case, the court held that Rhode Island General Laws § 42-72-8 does not con-
tain a testimonial privilege which would prohibit the Department of Children,
Youth and Families (DCYF) from responding to a subpoena duces tecum seeking
the health and family history of the adopted child. Id.
2. 661 A.2d 67 (R.I. 1995).
3. Id. at 68.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. (A congenital or acquired condition in which the head is abnormally
enlarged).
8. Id. (Abnormalities of, and around, the eyes).
9. Id. (Deformities of the bones and structure of the mouth).
10. Id. (Abnormal, rapid heart rhythm).
11. Id. (Permanent deflection, or moving to one side, of the little fingers).
1996]
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the hands, and poor coordination. 12 Currently, Christopher is
mentally retarded and severely behaviorally disturbed. 13
In 1991, the Mallettes instituted suit against CFS claiming
great mental anguish and emotional distress as the result of the
negligent misrepresentations of CFS. 14 The Mallettes contended
that CFS negligently omitted material information concerning
Christopher's medical and family history. 15 Specifically, it was al-
leged that Christopher's biological mother's medical problems were
known by CFS prior to the adoption. 16 The Mallettes further
claimed that they had incurred enormous expenses for Christo-
pher's medical treatment and psychiatric care.' 7 CFS filed a mo-
tion to dismiss, which was denied by the trial court.' 8 CFS then
petitioned the Rhode Island Supreme Court for a writ of
certiorari. 19
BACKGROUND
American courts began only recently to recognize causes of ac-
tion for "wrongful adoption."20 However, there is still considerable
confusion in the area because the term "wrongful adoption" has
been used to describe several distinct common law actions. 2 ' Con-
fusion has become so prevalent that many jurisdictions have dis-
carded the idea of a "wrongful adoption" tort in favor of extending
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. Prior to this decision, the Mallettes filed a second claim on March 17,
1994 for intentional misrepresentation. Because this claim was filed after the peti-
tion for certiorari, both parties agreed that it was not before the Supreme Court at
this time.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 69 (citing Burr v. Board of County Comm'rs of Stark County, 491
N.E.2d 1101 (Ohio 1986) (recognizing a claim for intentional misrepresentation in
the adoption context)).
21. These include negligent misrepresentation, intentional misrepresentation,
fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress. See, e.g., Juman v. Louise
Wise Servs., 620 N.Y.S.2d 371 (1995). See generally, Note, When Love Is Not
Enough: Toward a Unified Wrongful Adoption Tort, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1761,
(1992).
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the application of negligent misrepresentation to the adoption con-
text.22 For Rhode Island, this was a case of first impression.
ANALYsis AND HOLDING
The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the Mallette's
claims and concluded that, although many causes of action were
suggested, the fundamental claim was grounded in the tort of neg-
ligent misrepresentation. 23 The narrow issue that the court ad-
dressed was whether Rhode Island should extend this tort to the
adoption context.24 CFS contended that negligence theories were
inapplicable because the agency owed no duty of care to the Mallet-
tes. In addition, CFS argued that Rhode Island public policy pre-
cluded the extension of the tort of negligent misrepresentation to
the adoption context.25 The court disagreed. 26
In its analysis, the court first considered whether CFS owed a
duty of care to the Mallettes as prospective parents. 27 Whether
such a duty exists is a legal question for the court's determina-
tion.28 To make this determination, the court must consider all
relevant factors, including the relationship of the parties, the scope
and burden of the obligation, and public policy. 2 9 The Rhode Is-
land Supreme Court found that CFS did owe a duty of care to the
Mallettes even though Rhode Island law does not require that an
adoption agency disclose all relevant information about the child.30
The court considered opinions from other jurisdictions which had
found a duty to disclose accurate information, and determined that
the duty in these cases did not stem from state statutes but rather
22. See, e.g., Gibbs v. Ernst, 647 A.2d 882, 886 (Pa. 1994).
23. Mallette, 661 A.2d at 69. The elements that must be established in order
to prove negligent misrepresentation are: "(1) a misrepresentation of a material
fact; (2) the representor must either know of the misrepresentation, must make
the misrepresentation without knowledge as to its truth or falsity or must make
the representation under circumstances in which he ought to have known of its
falsity; (3) the representor must intend the representation to induce another to act
on it; and (4) injury must result to the party acting in justifiable reliance upon the
misrepresentation." Id. (quoting Gibbs, 647 A.2d at 890).
24. Mallette, 661 A.2d at 70.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. See Ferreira v. Strack, 636 A.2d 682 (R.I. 1994).
29. Mallette, 661 A.2d at 70. See Kenney Mfg. Co. v. Starkwhether & Shepley,
Inc., 643 A.2d 203, 206 (R.I. 1994).
30. Mallette, 661 A.2d at 70.
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from the adoption agencies' voluntary dissemination of health in-
formation concerning the child to the potential adoptive parents.3 1
In the instant case, when CFS began to volunteer information con-
cerning Christopher's family health and genetic background the
agency assumed the necessary duty. 32 The court held that in order
to avoid liability an adoption agency must refrain from making
representations or, if it does make them, it must do so in a non-
negligent manner. 33
The court next considered whether this decision might give
adoption agencies incentive to remain silent when they had rele-
vant, but unfavorable, information.3 4 Prospective adoptive par-
ents are at the mercy of agencies to disclose the health and genetic
history of the children for whom they will become financially and
emotionally responsible. 35 Although the Rhode Island General As-
sembly has chosen to remain silent regarding the need for adoption
agencies to disclose health information, 36 the court explained that
full disclosure of available, nonidentifying information is the
ideal.37 By extending the tort of negligent misrepresentation to
the adoption context the court stated that adoptive parents would
at least be alerted by an agency which chooses to remain silent
rather than give the true information.3 8
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the tort of negli-
gent misrepresentation extends to the adoption process. The fact
that no statute requires adoption agencies to disclose relevant in-
formation to the prospective adoptive parents does not preclude a
court from finding a duty on the part of the agency to give accurate
31. Id. See, e.g., M.H. v. Caritas Family Serv., 488 N.W.2d 282, 288 (Minn.
1992); Meracle v. Children's Serv. Soc'y of Wisconsin, 437 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Wis.
1989).
32. Mallette, 661 A.2d at 71.
33. Id. at 73.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. See Paula K Bebenese, In the Best Interests of the Child and Adoptive
Parents: The Need for Disclosure, 78 Iowa L. Rev. 397, 404 n. 65 (1993) (noting
that Rhode Island, Nevada and Alaska are the only three states which do not re-
quire adoption agencies to collect or disclose information on the adoptee's medical
or social background).
37. Mallette, 661 A.2d at 73.
38. Id.
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background material pertinent to the child. Although the agency
may avoid this liability by remaining silent, this silence will hope-
fully alert prospective parents to carefully examine their decision
to adopt a particular child.
Deborah J. Miller-Tornabene
